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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine – as a service member – you arrive at a United States
Armed Forces hospital to undergo an abdominal operation. You
walk up to the front desk, and the receptionist is on the phone
holding up her index finger signaling you to wait. You look around,
and there are only a handful of people in the waiting room. The
receptionist interrupts your thoughts to check you in, and a nurse
comes to take you back to your room. As instructed, you change into
a hospital gown and slide your feet into the hospital socks. With a
chill finding its way into your gown, you slip under the covers in the
hospital bed and wait to be taken into surgery. The anesthesiologist
arrives to put you under, you give your family members a hug and
a kiss and are then rolled away to the operating room. While the
Armed Forces’ surgeons perform surgery, complications arise, and
because of their negligent medical treatment, you die on the
operating table. Your grieving family files suit to recover damages
for your wrongful death, but the court finds for the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, holding that suit cannot be
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brought against the federal government for personal injury or
wrongful death when such was incident to or arose out of service.1
Now imagine – as a civilian – you arrive at your local hospital
to undergo a similar abdominal operation. Under the same
circumstances as above, your doctor’s negligent medical treatment
causes your untimely death. Your grieving family files suit to
recover damages for your wrongful death, and the court finds for
your family. Your family is awarded damages for funeral expenses,
emotional distress, loss of companionship, and consortium.
Prior to 2020, service members and their family members could
not hold the government liable for personal injury “where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.”2 The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”)
now allows service members or their family members “to file claims
for personal injury or death caused by negligence or wrongful acts
by a Department of Defense employed health care provider in a
military hospital or clinic.”3 Prior to the NDAA being signed into
law, Feres v. United States barred service members from such
redress under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).4 While the
NDAA does not overrule Feres, it provides redress to service
members denied to them since the ruling of Feres in 1950.5
*Lindsay R. Wright, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. I sat
in Torts my first year of law school and was baffled at the existence of the Feres
Doctrine. I chose this topic to bring light to service members’ small victory in
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, but also to demonstrate how
far we still need to go to protect the constitutional rights of those who serve.
1. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
2. Id. The Supreme Court held that “[w]ithout exception, the relationship of
military personnel to the Government has been governed exclusively by federal
law.” Id. “We do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new
cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries or death
due to negligence.” Id. We cannot impute to Congress such a radical departure
from established law in the absence of express congressional command.” Id.
3. Patricia Kime, Got a Military Medical Malpractice Claim? Here’s How to
File, MILITARY TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), www.militarytimes.com/paybenefits/2020/01/10/got-a-military-medical-malpractice-claim-heres-how-tofile/ [perma.cc/384G-RNHJ]. “The law requires the Pentagon to establish a
system for personnel to file malpractice claims and provide an update to
Congress on the regulations required for implementation.” Id. “The new law
designates $400 million to the Pentagon to investigate claims and award
compensation.” Id. “It gives victims two years after the malpractice incident to
file a claim, with the exception of this year.” Id. “Those filing a claim in 2020
can seek redress for incidents dating to 2017.” Id.
4. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
5. See Leo Shane III, Military Medical Malpractice Victims Could see
Payouts from Defense Department Under New Compromise, MILITARY TIMES
(Dec. 9, 2019), www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagoncongress/2019/12/10/military-medical-malpractice-victims-could-see-payoutsfrom-defense-department-under-new-compromise/ [perma.cc/NH9D-CHUN]
(explaining that although the NDAA “‘does not change or repeal the Feres
doctrine, it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to allow, settle, and pay an
administrative claim against the United States for personal injury or death . . .
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However, as demonstrated above, the forms of redress available to
service members compared to civilians was and still is,
disproportionate. Service members should be offered equal forms of
redress as civilians for personal injury or death caused by
negligence. Disproportionate redress for service members places
undue hardship on those serving their country from rightful
compensation.
Part II of this Comment will explore the background of redress
available to service members in the United States Armed Forces. It
will first focus on the adoption of the FTCA, the first piece of
legislation permitting suit to be brought against the federal
government. Then, it will review pre- and post- Feres Doctrine
jurisprudence. Lastly, it will provide a brief overview of the NDAA,
the first piece of legislation since the adoption of the Feres Doctrine
that provides service members some redress for medical
malpractice.
Part III of this Comment will dive into the NDAA. It will break
down the relevant subsections of the NDAA and the redress offered
to service members. Then, it will analyze the disparities in redress
between civilians and service members.
Part IV of this Comment will discuss the policy changes needed
to combat the disproportionate redress offered to service members.
It will begin by addressing service members’ due process rights.
Then, it will discuss the need for legislative changes in the
prescribed regulations of the NDAA. Lastly, it will discuss proposals
for payment of medical malpractice claims under the NDAA.

II. BACKGROUND
The forms of redress available to service members can be
traced back to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which “refers to
the fact that the government cannot be sued without its consent.”6
Sovereign immunity, derived from English common law, is based on
the premise that the King could do no wrong.7 The doctrine of

that was the result of medical malpractice caused by a Department of Defense
health care provider.’”).
6. Sovereign Immunity, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sovereign_immunity [perma.cc/X7DE-67T7] (last
visited Aug. 15, 2021). “Sovereign immunity was derived from British common
law doctrine based on the idea that the King could do no wrong.” Id. “In the
United States, sovereign immunity typically applies to the federal government
and state government, but not to municipalities.” Id. “Federal and state
governments, however, have the ability to waive their sovereign immunity.” Id.
“The federal government did this when it passed the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which waived federal immunity for numerous types of torts claims.” Id.
7. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (explaining that
“sovereign immunity [is] based ‘on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends’”) (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)).
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sovereign immunity essentially prohibits “a suit against an
unconsenting sovereign for money damages.”8
Congress has waived such immunity in certain circumstances
to provide individuals the opportunity for redress and to make the
federal government more amenable to suits.9 One such
circumstance stems from the adoption of the FTCA where suit can
be brought against the federal government for injury to a person or
damage to property by a federal government employee acting within
the scope of their employment.10 The redress now available to
service members for personal injury can be traced back to the
adoption of the FTCA and the jurisprudence that followed.11 To set
the stage for scrutinizing the NDAA, it is crucial to unravel the
adoption of the FTCA and how common law jurisprudence has
impacted service members’ compensation opportunities for personal
injury.

A. Federal Tort Claims Act
Tort law aims to “provide relief to injured parties for harms
caused by others, to impose liability on parties responsible for the
harm, and to deter others from committing harmful acts.”12 Like
civilians, employees of the federal government commit torts.13
Before the FTCA was passed in 1946, a “suit could not be brought
against the Federal Government for injury to a person or damage to
property caused by an employee of the United States.”14 Relief for
such injury or damage could only be obtained through
8. Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law,
“Accident,” and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 765 (2008).
9. See id. at 778 (stating that Congress “has permitted suits for monetary
relief brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.”).
10. 8 Am. Juris. Trials § 3 (2020).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2021); see also Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S.
932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied; see also United States v.
Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); see also Daniel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1713
(2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied.
12.
Tort,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort
[perma.cc/W5UQ-P6MQ] (last visited Aug. 15, 2021). “Typically, a party seeking
redress through tort law will ask for damages in the form of monetary
compensation.” Id. “Less common remedies include injunction and restitution.”
Id.
13. KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2019). “Until the mid-20th century,
however, the principle of ‘sovereign immunity’ – a legal doctrine that bars
private citizens from suing a sovereign government without its consent –
prohibited plaintiffs from suing the United States for the tortious actions of
federal officers and employees.” Id. “Thus, for a substantial portion of this
nation’s history, persons injured by torts committed by the federal government’s
agents were generally unable to obtain financial compensation through the
judicial system.” Id.
14. 8 Am. Jur. Trials 635 § 3 (2020).
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Congressional legislation to compensate a tort victim for their
loss.15 However, unlike civilians, sovereign immunity barred those
harmed by employees or federal officers from filing suits against the
United States.16
Thus, Congress passed the FTCA to prevent further injustice
and to eliminate the burden previously placed on Congress to
handle such claims.17 Under the FTCA, “[i]ndividuals who are
injured or whose property is damaged by the wrongful or negligent
act of a federal employee acting in the scope of his or her official
duties may file a claim with the government for reimbursement for
that injury or damage.”18 To state a valid claim under the FTCA, an
individual must demonstrate the following:
(1) he was injured or his property was damaged by a federal
government employee; (2) the employee was acting within the scope
of his official duties; (3) the employee was acting negligently or
wrongfully; and (4) the negligent or wrongful act proximately caused
the injury or damage of which he complains.19

The FTCA provides for exclusive jurisdiction on matters
against the United States, such as money damages, injury to an
individual or property damage, or personal injury or death.20 The
FTCA serves to deter tortious acts by federal employees while
encouraging the government to oversee the actions of their
employees closer than before.21 While the FTCA does not “create a
new federal cause of action against the United States,” it does waive
the federal government’s right to sovereign immunity for certain
types of tort claims.22 The FTCA “marks the culmination of a long
effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from
15. LEWIS, supra note 13. “For a substantial portion of this nation’s history,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred citizens injured by the torts of a
federal officer or employee from initiating or prosecuting a lawsuit against the
United States.” Id. “Until 1946, ‘the only practical recourse for citizens injured
by the torts of federal employees was to ask Congress to enact private legislation
affording them relief’ through ‘private bills.’” Id. (quoting Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d
490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
16. Id.
17. 8 Am. Jur. Trials 635 § 3 (2020). “Claimants could obtain relief only by
the introduction of private bills in Congress.” Id. As a result, many bills were
introduced, but reviewing all of the bills began to impose a burden. Id.
“Approximately 2,000 such bills were introduced in each Congress from the
Sixty-eighth through the Seventy-eighth, and some 20 per cent of these bills
were enacted.” Id.
18. United States House of Representatives, Federal Tort Claims Act,
www.house.gov/doing-business-with-the-house/leases/federal-tort-claims-act
[perma.cc/97Q2-HUCC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2021).
19. Id. “The claimant must also provide documentation establishing that his
claim satisfies all the elements of the FTCA.” Id. “A person wishing to make a
claim for reimbursement under the FTCA for damage or injury caused by a
House employee must first file an administrative claim with the House.” Id.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2021).
21. LEWIS, supra note 13.
22. Id.
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suit.”23

B. Leading Up to the Feres Doctrine
In 1949, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the FTCA
and military service for the first time.24 In Brooks v. United States,
the issue before the Court was “whether members of the United
States armed forces can recover under that Act for injuries not
incident to their service.”25 Arthur Brooks was driving along a
highway on a rainy night with his father, James Brooks, and
brother, Welker Brooks.26 After stopping at an intersection, Arthur
proceeded across the road and a civilian employee, driving a United
States Army truck, struck him.27 Both Arthur and Welker were
service members at the time of the accident.28 Arthur was killed on
impact, and his father and brother were severely injured.29
Welker sued the United States, and the district court found for
Welker and the decedent.30 However, the court of appeals reversed
on the grounds that the brothers’ service at the time of the accident
barred them from recovery.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and found that the statutory language and history of the FTCA
required a holding in favor of Welker and the administrator of
Arthur’s estate, but remanded to the court of appeals for
reconsideration of reducing damages.32 The Court noted, however,
that:
[W]e are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the
Brooks’ army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in
the sense that all human events depend upon what has already
transpired. Were the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly
different case would be presented.33

It was not until 1950 that the Court considered injuries incident to
service in Feres v. United States. 34

23. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
24. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
25. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cooper T. Fyfe, The Detrimental Pitfall of the FTCA: Overturning Feres
& Endorsing the Sergeant First Class Richard Stayskal Military Medical
Accountability Act of 2019, 52 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 877, 883 (2020).
30. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
31. See United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337
U.S. 49 (1949) (explaining that “the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to
claims by soldiers in the United States Army, even when those claims arise out
of injuries or death which, as here, are not service-caused.”).
32. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 54.
33. Id. at 52.
34. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
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C. Feres Doctrine
While the Supreme Court found for the Brooks brothers, that
holding was limited to such injuries that are not incident to nor in
the course of their military or other government services.35
However, this was not the case in Feres, where the Court considered
three actions against the United States in one opinion under the
FTCA: Feres v. United States, Jefferson v. United States, and United
States v. Griggs.36 “The three cases were related because each
serviceman, while on active duty, sustained injury due to negligence
of armed forces personnel.”37
In Feres, Beatrice Feres, as executrix of Rudolph Feres,
brought suit against the United States for damages under the
FTCA.38 A fire killed Rudolph in the barracks while he was on active
duty as a lieutenant in the Army.39 Beatrice Feres alleged
negligence on behalf of Rudolph’s fellow officers who required
Rudolph to stay in the barracks, which they knew or should have
known was unsafe because of a defective heating plant.40
In Jefferson, Arthur Jefferson sued the United States for
negligence under the FTCA after injuries resulting from an
abdominal operation by an army surgeon.41 The surgery was
performed at an Army hospital to remove one of his kidneys.42 After
the surgery, Arthur suffered many complications and underwent a
subsequent surgery whereby the surgeon found a towel in his
stomach that was beginning to work its way into his small
intestine.43 Arthur alleged that the negligent operation made him
35. Id. at 54.
36. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37.
37. Jeffrey R. Simmons, Military Medical Malpractice, 23 ARIZ. B.J. 22, 24
(1988). The Feres Court advanced three reasons for its holding. Id. The first
reason was the absence of parallel private liability required by the FTCA. Id.
Second, the Court rationalized that because liability under the FTCA depends
upon ‘the law of the place where the [negligent] act or omission occurred,’
Congress could not have intended the varying local tort laws of each state to
control important aspects of the ‘distinctively federal’ relationship between the
United States and military personnel. Id. The third rationale was that Congress
could not have intended to make FTCA suits available to servicemen who have
already received payments under the Veterans' Benefit Act (‘VBA’) to
compensate for injuries suffered incident to service.” Id.
38. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1949).
39. Id. Rudolph Feres was stationed “in Pine Camp, New York, a military
post of the United States in which he had been required to be quartered by
superior officers.” Id.
40. Id.
41. See Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1949)
(explaining that the district court found that “a towel used during an operation
had been left in a surgical wound through the negligence of government
employees at the hospital, and in consequence the plaintiff had suffered serious
injuries.”).
42. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 708 (D. Md. 1948).
43. Id. at 709. “After the [removal of the towel, Jefferson] was subsequently
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totally and permanently disabled.44
In Griggs, Edith Griggs, as executrix of Dudley Griggs, brought
suit against the United States under the FTCA for the death of her
husband.45 Dudley was on active duty as a Lieutenant Colonel in
the United States Army.46 Dudley was admitted to an Army
hospital under official orders for surgery, during which he met his
untimely death.47 Edith alleged “he met death because of negligent
and unskillful medical treatment by army surgeons.”48
The issue raised in front of the Supreme Court was whether
the FTCA extended to individuals “sustaining ‘incident to the
service’ what under other circumstances would be an actionable
wrong.”49 The Court held that such relief under the FTCA did not
extend to service members “whose activity at the time of the injury
was incident to military service.”50 The Court in Feres argued that
it was unaware of any law in the United States that would permit
a service member to recover for negligence from their superiors or
the government for which they serve.51 The Court therefore found
that “the FTCA barred all three claims” and “that each injury
resulted from activities incident to service.”52 Such bar to relief
treated at the Marine Hospital in Baltimore, medically and surgically.” Id. “He
was later examined . . . and found to have sustained a serious hernia which was
attributed . . . to the after effects of the operation … thought to have been caused
by inflammation or infection as a post-operative result of the removal of the
towel.” Id. Jefferson “gets some relief from the effects of the hernia by wearing
a corset.” Id. “He is able to walk about and stand around but cannot well lean
forward either standing or sitting in a chair.” Id. Jefferson “is not employable
industrially but could do clerical work if otherwise qualified therefor.” Id. “As
[Jefferson] is nearly 50 years of age and a mechanic by prior occupation, it is
doubtful if he could engage in any gainful employable pursuit.” Id.
44. Id. at 708.
45. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1949).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
49. Id. at 138. The Court noted that Feres was the “‘wholly different case’
reserved from our decision in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).” Id.
In Brooks, the Court addressed “whether members of the United States armed
forces can recover under that Act for injuries not incident to their service.”
Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50. The Court in Feres found that “the Brooks case . . .
interprets the Act to cover claims not incidental to service, and it is argued that
much of its reasoning is as apt to impose liability in favor of a man on duty as
in favor of one on leave.” Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
50. § 2:48. Feres doctrine, generally, 1 Civ. Actions Against the U.S. § 2:48.
“The Feres doctrine applies to members of the National Guard and other reserve
forces who are injured while engaged in their weekend drills or inactive duty
training. The Feres doctrine also applies to cadets at United States military
academies.” Id.
51. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
52. Cornelia P. Weiss, Exploring Military Medical Malpractice Actions: The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 25 COLO. LAW. 77, 78 (1996) (“Thus, under the Feres
doctrine, all military personnel claims arising out of injuries incurred incident
to service are barred. The term ‘incident to service’ has remained a stumbling
block for the courts.”).
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became known as the Feres Doctrine.53

D. Post-Feres v. United States
The Feres Doctrine stripped the redress available to service
members for personal injury in the course of or incident to service.
The Doctrine “deprive[d] members of the military a right allowed to
all other United States citizens.”54 A myriad of cases followed Feres
in hopes of overruling the harsh effects of the doctrine.55 One such
case came in 1954; in United States v. Brown, an armed services
veteran sought damages from the federal government under the
FTCA “for negligence in the treatment of his left knee in a Veterans
Administration hospital.”56 The veteran was discharged from
service in 1944 because of an injury to his leg; he underwent two
surgeries, during which “an allegedly defective tourniquet was
used” that resulted in serious and permanent nerve damage to his
leg.57 Instead of seizing the opportunity to overrule Feres, the Court
doubled down and “propelled the military discipline rationale . . . to
the frontlines of the issue.”58 While the Court found that its holding
in Brooks – not Feres – governed Brown, the Court noted that:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act
were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed
in the course of military duty, led the Court to read that Act as

53. See generally Feres, 340 U.S. 135.
54. Simmons, supra note 37, at 23. “Although the FTCA expressly excludes
a number of claims, it contains no provision excluding claims by military
personnel that arise out of service-related activities during peacetime.” Id. In
Feres, the Supreme Court created an exception that denies recovery to members
of the uniformed services, even when they are not in combat. Id.
55. E.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); United States v.
Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied; Daniel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1713
(2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied.
56. Brown, 348 U.S. at 110.
57. Id. at 110-11.
58. Jennifer L. Zyznar, Feres Doctrine: “Don’t Let This Be It. Fight!”, 46 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 620 (2013). The Feres Court stated that the Federal Tort
Claims Act “provided that the ‘United States shall be liable . . . in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.’” Id. at 615 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 141). However, in Feres,
[t]he Court reasoned that the United States cannot be liable to members
of its Armed Forces because no private individual can be held liable in
the same manner. Since a private individual does not typically raise an
army, a private individual cannot be sued by one of his or her service
members. Thus, the United States remains immune in that manner as
well.
Id.
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excluding claims of that character.59

As such, the Court argued that Congress did not intend to permit
such suits in the course of or incident to service because “they would
unduly interfere with military discipline.”60
In 1987, in United States v. Johnson, the Court considered
another issue under Feres regarding whether the Doctrine “bars an
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a service
member killed during the course of an activity incident to service,
where the complaint alleges negligence on the part of civilian
employees of the Federal Government.”61 Lieutenant Commander
Johnson of the United States Coast Guard was a helicopter pilot.62
His crew was dispatched to search for a missing vessel, whereby
they had to request radar assistance from the Federal Aviation
Administration due to low visibility; shortly after receiving
assistance, the helicopter crashed, killing Johnson and the rest of
his crew.63 Johnson’s wife filed suit under the FTCA seeking
damages alleging negligence on the part of the Federal Aviation
Administration for Johnson’s death.64 The Court drew from its
ruling in Brown, stating that “‘[s]uits . . . could undermine the
commitment essential to effective service and thus have the
potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the
word.’”65 As such, the Court reaffirmed Feres.66
In the last decade, the Court declined to hear two cases that

59. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
60. Simmons, supra note 37, at 24. “This rationale was supported by ‘the
peculiar and special relationship of a soldier to his superiors, and effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might
obtain if suits under the Torts Claim Act were allowed for negligent orders given
or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty . . .’” Id.
61. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 682.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 683.
64. Id.
65. Zyznar, supra note 58, at 620 (quoting Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691). “In
United States v. Johnson, the Court elaborated that ‘military discipline involves
not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service
and to one's country.’” Id. In upholding the military discipline rationale, the
Court further preserved a system that allowed issues to be swept under the rug.
The Court held that “[p]reservation of military discipline ensures the efficiency
and order of military operations, and this interest outweighs the service
member's right to tort recovery even if the injury arises from circumstances
unrelated to his or her military rank or operations.” Id. While military discipline
ensures a smooth-running system, so too does holding service members
accountable for their actions, which the Court failed to recognize or
acknowledge.
66. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
FTCA, as written, “renders the United States liable to all persons, including
servicemen, injured by the negligence of Government employees” and that the
effects on military discipline cannot be wholly ascertained to justify the holding
in Feres) (emphasis in original).
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could have reconsidered Feres.67 In Daniel v. United States, a naval
officer died of a complication after giving birth; the officer’s husband
filed suit under the FTCA alleging wrongful death and medical
negligence.68 In Lanus v. United States, a Coast Guardsmen died in
a fire in his assigned housing; his mother brought suit under the
FTCA alleging negligence because of safety deficiencies in his
assigned housing.69 In both cases, Justice Thomas dissented from
denial of certiorari on the grounds that “‘Feres was wrongly decided
and heartily deserves the widespread, almost universal criticism it
has received.’”70 Justice Thomas argued that the Feres Doctrine
deprives service members any sort of relief when they suffer injury
or damage “by the negligence of the Government or its employees.”71
The continued denial of relief to service members has led to
unfortunate repercussions and will continue to do so until the Court
reconsiders Feres.72

E. 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
On December 20, 2019, NDAA was signed into law.73 The
NDAA allows service members or their families “to file claims for
personal injury or death caused by negligence or wrongful acts by a
Department of Defense employed health care provider in a military
hospital or clinic.”74 The Act permits the Secretary of Defense
(“Secretary”) to settle and pay claims against the United States “for
personal injury or death incident to the service of a member of the
uniformed services that was caused by the medical malpractice of a

67. E.g., Lanus, 570 U.S. 932; Daniel, 139 S. Ct. 1713.
68. Daniel v. United States, 889 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2018).
69. Lanus v. United States, 492 F. App’x 66, 67 (11th Cir. 2012).
70. Lanus, 570 U.S. at 933 (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied. (quoting
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700. “While the [FTCA] contains a number of exceptions
to this broad waiver of immunity, ‘none generally precludes FTCA suits brought
by servicemen.’” Id.
71. Id. “Nevertheless, in Feres, the Court held that ‘the Government is not
liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to service.’” Id. at 932-33 (quoting
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146). “There is no support for this conclusion in the text of
the statute, and it has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen of
any remedy when they are injured by the negligence of the Government or its
employees.” Id. at 933.
72. See Daniel, 139 S. Ct. at 1713 (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied
(stating that the district court found that Feres barred the suit, and that “[t]he
Court of Appeals ‘regretfully’ reached the same conclusion and affirmed”).
73. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No.
116-92, § 731, 133 Stat. 1198, 1457 (2019).
74. Kime, supra note 3. “The law requires the Pentagon to establish a system
for personnel to file malpractice claims and provide an update to Congress on
the regulations required for implementation.” Id. “It gives victims two years
after the malpractice incident to file a claim, with the exception of this year.”
Id.
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Department of Defense health care provider.”75 While the NDAA
does not overrule the Feres Doctrine, it provides relief denied to
service members since Feres was decided in 1950.76

III. ANALYSIS
With respect to redress for medical malpractice, the forms of
relief available to members of the armed forces varies greatly
compared to civilians. To distinguish the disparities, this Comment
will evaluate the current legislation and redress afforded to (A)
members of the armed forces and (B) civilians.

A. Members of the Armed Forces
Pursuant to the NDAA, redress is now available to members
of the armed forces.77 This section will address the main
components of the NDAA: (1) the general authorization of claims;
(2) requirements for claims; (3) liability; (4) payment of claims; and
(5) a required annual report on the progress of claims.
1. General Authorization of Claims Under the National
Defense Authorization Act
The NDAA permits the Secretary to “allow, settle, and pay a
claim against the United States for personal injury or death
incident to the service of a member of the armed forces that was
caused by the medical malpractice of a Department of Defense
health care provider.”78 In addition to such power, subsection (a)
leaves open the power of the Secretary to prescribe any regulations
“as the Secretary considers appropriate” under subsection (f) of the
NDAA.79 While our military is civilian controlled, there is a chain of
command that finds its way back to the military’s independent
75. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No.
116-92, § 731, 133 Stat. 1198, 1457-59 (2019).
76. See Shane III, supra note 5 (explaining that while the NDAA “‘does not
change or repeal the Feres doctrine, it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
allow, settle, and pay an administrative claim against the United States for
personal injury or death … that was the result of medical malpractice caused
by a Department of Defense health care provider’”).
77. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731.
78. Id.
79. § 731, 133 Stat. at 1459. Subsection (a) allows the Secretary to act
pursuant to the powers granted in this section and “under such regulations as
the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe under subsection (f).” § 731, 133 Stat.
at 1457. Subsection (f)(1) provides that “The Secretary of Defense shall
prescribe regulations to implement this section.” § 731, 133 Stat. at 1458. While
subsection (a) prescribes the Secretary specific powers to “allow, settle, and pay”
claims, this section in conjunction with subsection (f) give the Secretary almost
unlimited authority. § 731, 133 Stat. at 1457-59.
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policing of issues.80 The NDAA gives authorization to the Secretary
to be the judge, the jury, and the executioner.81 Such adjudication
of medical malpractice claims pursuant to the NDAA prevents
service members from filing claims in court; such claims are only
permitted to be adjudicated administratively.82
Although it can be argued that the Secretary’s exclusive
jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims promotes military
discipline and adherence to the chain of command to eliminate
confusion, such hierarchy can be detrimental to uncovering or
exposing the truth or negligence.83 While the NDAA does not
overrule the Feres Doctrine, the military discipline84 rationale is a
relevant factor in understanding the government’s denial of redress
to service members.85 Since Feres, the Supreme Court has propelled
the idea of military discipline as “the prevailing justification for the
Feres Doctrine.”86 As such, it appears as though the Feres Doctrine
has seeped into the NDAA, perpetuating the rationale of military
discipline by giving the Secretary sole discretion.87 While the chain
80. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Chain of Command & Authority,
www.va.gov/vetsinworkplace/docs/em_authority.asp [perma.cc/DB5L-ES6T]
(last updated July 7, 2021). “The chain of command is the line of authority and
responsibility along which orders are passed within a military unit and between
different units.” Id. “An individual’s placement in the hierarchy determines his
or her level of authority.” Id. “In the military, it is considered bad form to
challenge or question authority.” Id. It is this structure that leads to the
independent policing of issues and essentially forbids those lower in the chain
of command from reporting things or speaking their mind.
81. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731.
82. David P. Sheldon & Corey D. Bean, Explainer: Can You Now Sue the
Military for Medical Malpractice?, NAVYTIMES (Dec. 26, 2019),
www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/12/26/explainer-can-you-now-suethe-military-for-medical-malpractice/ [perma.cc/7CVH-2NYY]. “Even for those
who can file a claim, without the possibility of taking a case to federal court, the
service member will have little recourse if he disagrees with the Defense
Department’s assessment of his case.” Id. “Also, the Department of Defense has
little institutional experience handling medical malpractice claims.” Id.
83. Angela Halvorson, Understanding the Military: The Institution, the
Culture and the People, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMIN. 7-9 (2010), www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/military_
white_paper_final.pdf [perma.cc/ZH48-B3ML].
84. Command Sgt. Maj. Shelton R. Williamson, Standards and Discipline:
An In-Depth Look at Where We Once Were and Where We Are Now, ARMY U.
PRESS
(Nov.
10,
2017),
www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCOJournal/Archives/2017/November/Standards-and-Discipline/ [perma.cc/K8CN3PUY] (explaining that the military discipline is defined as “the state of order
and obedience among personnel in a military organization and is characterized
by the [service member’s] prompt and willing responsiveness to orders and
understanding compliance to regulation”).
85. Zyznar, supra note 58, at 616.
86. Id.
87. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731, 133 Stat.
1198, 1457-59 (2019). Subsection (a) in conjunction with subsection (f) of the
NDAA grants the Secretary the power to decide, settle and pay claims filed by
members of the uniformed services, in addition to allowing the Secretary to
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of command fosters military discipline, providing such discretion
solely within the confines of the military can lead to groupthink88
and negatively impact a service member’s chance of redress.
In the civilian world, a medical malpractice claim receives
scrutiny from more than one individual from cradle to grave.89 On
the other hand, by concentrating the authority to the Secretary, “the
chain of command can serve to suppress the uncovering of unethical
behavior to the point of actually encouraging it.”90 In the civilian
world, medical malpractice claims are brought by attorneys and
adjudicated in court.91 Limiting review and adjudication to the
Secretary is contradictory to the representation and judicial review
afforded to civilians.92 Although the chain of command serves many
positive functions in the day-to-day military, affording such
authority and full discretion to the Secretary under the NDAA can
prevent rightful compensation to service members.
2. Requirements for Claims Under the National Defense
Authorization Act
Under subsection (b) of the NDA – Requirements for Claims –
claims for medical malpractice by members of the armed forces can
be “allowed, settled, and paid under subsection (a) only if” the
following conditions are met:
(1) The claim is filed by the service member, or by an authorized
person on behalf of the service member;
(2) The claim is for personal injury or death caused by medical
malpractice by a Department of Defense health professional
acting within the scope of employment;
(3) The medical malpractice took place in a covered military facility;

decide how to implement such measures. Id.
88.
Groupthink,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY,
www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/groupthink [perma.cc/6T9V-BZHK] (last
visited Aug. 29, 2021) (“Groupthink is a phenomenon that occurs when a group
of well-intentioned people make irrational or non-optimal decisions spurred by
the urge to conform or the belief that dissent is impossible.”).
89. FindLaw Attorney Writers, Stages of a Medical Malpractice Case,
THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2017), www.corporate.findlaw.com/litigationdisputes/stages-of-a-medical-malpractice-case.html [perma.cc/UBE2-E3GM].
In a medical malpractice case in the civilian world, there are many stages:
“consultation with an attorney, investigation, tribunal, discovery, settlement
and trial.” Id.
90. Charles Dominick, Problems with the Textbook Chain of Command, And
a Solution, NLPA (May 23, 2018), www.certitrek.com/nlpa/blog/problemstextbook-chain-command-solution/ [perma.cc/HAH6-MSRJ] (“One of the
reasons you should be concerned is that, in a chain of command, your
subordinates’ values appear to reflect your values whether they do or not.”).
91. FindLaw Attorney Writers, supra note 89.
92. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731; see
FindLaw Attorney Writers, supra note 89.
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(4) The claim is brought to the Department of Defense within two
years after the claim arises;
(5) The claim cannot be settled and paid under any other law; and
(6) The claim is substantiated pursuant to the Secretary’s discretion
in subsection (f).93

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1073d – Military Medical Treatment
Facilities – covered “military medical treatment facilities” under
subsection (b) is defined as medical centers consisting of: “(A)
Inpatient and outpatient tertiary care facilities that incorporate
specialty and subspecialty care[;] (B) Graduate medical education
programs[;] (C) Residency training programs[; and] (D) Level one or
level two trauma care capabilities.”94 This also includes hospitals
and ambulatory care centers where civilian health care facilities
cannot meet the needs of service members and covered
beneficiaries.95
93. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731. Pursuant
to subsection (f) – Regulations – the Act grants the Secretary the discretion to
implement whatever regulations he deems appropriate or necessary. § 731, 133
Stat. at 1458. Such regulations are prescribed to include: (A) Procedures to
“ensure the timely, efficient and effective” filing of such claims; and
(B) Uniform standards consistent with generally accepted standards
used … in adjudicating claims under [the Federal Tort Claims Act] to be
applied to the evaluation, settlement, and payment of claims under this
section without regard to the place of occurrence of the medical
malpractice giving rise to the claim or the military department or service
of the member of the uniformed services, and without regard to foreign
law in the case of claims arising in foreign countries, including uniform
standards to be applied to determinations with respect to – (i) whether
an act or omission by a Department of Defense health care provider in
the context of performing medical, dental, or related health care
functions was negligent or wrongful, considering the specific facts and
circumstances; (ii) whether the personal injury or death of the member
was caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a Department
of Defense health care provider in the context of performing medical,
dental or related health care functions, considering the specific facts and
circumstances; (iii) requirements relating to proof of duty, breach of
duty, and causation resulting in compensable injury or loss, subject to
such exclusions as may be established by the Secretary of Defense; and
(iv) calculation of damages; [and] (C) Such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.”
Id. at 1458-59.
94. 10 U.S.C. § 1073d. Under § 1073d, hospitals “shall provide: (A) inpatient
and outpatient health services to maintain medical readiness; and (B) such
other programs and functions as the Secretary determines appropriate.” Id. The
hospitals under this title will include “limited specialty care that the Secretary
determines – (A) is cost effective; or (B) is not available at civilian health care
facilities in the area of the hospital.” Id. Additionally, “[a]mbulatory care
centers shall consist of outpatient care facilities with limited specialty care that
the Secretary determines – (A) is cost effective; or (B) is not available at civilian
health care facilities in the area of the ambulatory care center.” Id.
95. Id.
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Under subsection (b) of § 1073d, “covered military treatment
facility” does not include those operated by the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, or civilians and contractors under the Department
of Veterans Affairs.96 While the NDAA provides recourse to service
members in an area not previously afforded to them, denying relief
to service members based on active, inactive, reserve, or veteran
status perpetuates continued denial to those who have suffered
incident to service. Additionally, as prescribed in subsection (a) of
the NDAA, subsection (b) grants the Secretary overarching
authority to define the regulations of medical malpractice claims
under the NDAA.97 Subsection (b)(6) essentially provides the claim
be substantiated by non-existent regulations prescribed in
subsection (f) of the NDAA.98 The lack of prescribed regulations in
the NDAA raises a vagueness issue.99 The Supreme Court
suggested in Grayned v. City of Rockford, that “if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them.”100 Such vagueness in
the prescribed regulations of the NDAA would likely not hold in a
civilian court.101 While the NDAA is new and affords relief to service
members in an unprecedented area, the military’s lack of
experience with such claims should not deprive service members of
their due process to file such a claim in court.102 In Weiss v. United
States, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . recognized that the Due Process
96. Daniel Perrone, The Feres Doctrine: Still Alive and well after the 2020
National Defense Authorization Act?, JURIST (Mar. 14, 2020, 1:00 PM),
www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/03/daniel-perrone-feres-doctrine-ndaa/
[perma.cc/9ZE5-HWW6]. The Act “either reflects an intention of the legislature
to leave members of the uniformed services without recourse for harms suffered
incident to their service … or demonstrates ignorance that ‘VA health care
facilities are available to active duty service members in emergency situations
and upon referral by military treatment facilities[.]” Id.
97. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). “It is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Id. “Vague laws offend several important
values.” Id.
101. Philip A. Dynia, Vagueness, MIDDLE TENN. STATE U.: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1027/vagueness [perma.cc/6GEJ-3CEU].
102. Grayned, 408 U.S. 104. The Court in suggested the following for “why
overly vague statutes are unconstitutional”:
First, due process requires that a law provide fair warning and provides
a “persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.’ [And] [s]econd, the
law must provide “explicit standards” to law enforcement officials,
judges, and juries so as to avoid “arbitrary and discriminatory
application.”
Id.
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Clause applies to the military justice system.”103 Allowing the
Secretary to handle all matters relating to medical malpractice and
service members strips service members of the constitutional rights
afforded to civilians.
3. Liability Under the National Defense Authorization Act
Pursuant to subsection (c) – Liability – “[t]he Department of
Defense is liable for only the portion of compensable injury, loss, or
damages attributable to the medical malpractice of a Department
of Defense health care provider.”104 Additionally, it is not liable for
the claimant’s attorney’s fees.105 However, under subsection (g) of
the NDAA, the Department of Defense limits fees payable to
attorneys by the claimant to no more than 20% of any claim paid
pursuant to the NDAA.106
Under the American Rule regarding allocation of attorneys’
fees, the losing party does not pay the winning party’s attorneys’
fees absent a statutory authorization; each party pays his or her
own fees.107 The American Rule, like the Department of Defense’s
limit on attorneys’ fees, is a deterrent to service members from filing
claims: “The American Rule . . . makes it difficult or impossible to
assert claims when the cost of litigation exceeds the probable
recovery.”108 While the requirement of claims being adjudicated
administratively under the NDAA prevents costly litigation, the
regulations in subsection (f) are sparse and the sole discretion given
to the Secretary brings about uncertainty of relief to service
members; the benefit-cost ratio is a deterrence for service

103. The Bill of Rights’ Application in the Military Justice System,
CAAFLOG, www.caaflog.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132385649/bill_of_rights_rev_3.pdf
[perma.cc/RJW4-XJZ6] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021) (citing Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994)). “The due process test in the military context
asks whether the ‘factors militating in favor of’ the challenged practice ‘are so
extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.’” Id.
104. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No.
116-92, § 731, 133 Stat. 1198, 1458 (2019).
105. Id.
106. § 731, 133 Stat. at 1459.
107. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975). “In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.” Id. “At common law, costs
were not allowed; but for centuries in England there has been statutory
authorization to award costs, including attorneys' fees.” Id. “Although the
matter is in the discretion of the court, counsel fees are regularly allowed to the
prevailing party.” Id.
108. John Leubsdorf, Does the American Rule Promote Access to Justice?
Was that why it was Adopted?, 67 DUKE. L.J. 257, 259 (2019). “The American
Rule also provides less encouragement than the English Rule to assert claims
almost certain to prevail, because the prospect of recovering damages minus
litigation expenses is less enticing than that of recovering damages while
having the defendant cover litigation expenses.” Id. at 260.
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members.109
4. Payment of Claims Under the National Defense
Authorization Act
For the Determination and Payment of Claims under
subsection (d), the Secretary may pay a claimant up to $100,000;
any meritorious claim amount in excess of $100,000 must be
reported to the Secretary of Treasury for payment.110 In other
words, a claim substantiated by the Secretary “under $100,000 will
be paid directly to the service member or a surviving beneficiary by
the Department of Defense,” while the Treasury Department will
review those claims in excess of $100,000.111 Under subsection (d),
service members are essentially limited to $100,000 in damages
from the Secretary of Defense and anything beyond that amount,
despite the amount of harm or damage done, will be subject to
review.112 While this does not mean service members will not be
awarded more than $100,000, the initial amount is capped pending
further review.113 Although, in 2019, the average medical
malpractice payment for civilians was $384,065.114 As
demonstrated, there is a gross difference in the relief afforded to
civilians compared to service members.
5. Annual Report Under the National Defense
Authorization Act
Additionally, the NDAA requires the Secretary to submit an
Annual Report:
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of

109. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731, 133
Stat. at 1458.
110. Id. Additionally pursuant to subsection (d), “[e]xcept as provided in
paragraph (1), no claim may be paid under this section unless the amount
tendered is accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction.” Id.
111. Sheldon & Bean, supra note 82.
112. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731, 133
Stat. at 1458.
113. Id.
114. 2019 Medical Malpractice Payout Report, LEVERAGERX,
www.leveragerx.com/malpractice-insurance/2019-medical-malpractice-report/
[perma.cc/G4B9-4NSY] (last visited Aug. 16, 2021). The average payment
amount for quadriplegic, brain damage, or lifelong care: $961,185. Id. The
average payment amount for major permanent injury: $610,393. Id. The
average payment amount for significant permanent injury: $450,356. Id. The
average payment amount for death: $386,317. Id. The average payment amount
for minor permanent injury: $242,524. Id. The average payment amount for
major temporary injury: $227,063. Id. The average payment amount for
emotional injury only: $128,821. Id. The average payment amount for minor
temporary injury: $87,252. Id. The average payment amount for insignificant
injury: $40,030. Id.
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Representatives a report – (1) indicating the number of claims
processed under this section; (2) indicating the resolution of each such
claim; and (3) describing any other information that may enhance the
effectiveness of the claims process under this section.115

The Annual Report will help improve the system for members
of the armed forces bringing medical malpractice claims and
hopefully bring to light the limitations addressed above.116 Though
the NDAA provides for recognition of possible needed changes, the
Act itself does not provide the much deserved relief to service
members. The United States reveres service members – thanking
them for their service, honoring them at sporting events, providing
discounts, displaying American flags in their honor – yet the United
States does not provide the same level of redress available to
civilians. While such a report will address some limitations of the
current system, there are many shortcomings in the NDAA’s
attempt at providing redress to service members.

B. Civilians
Redress available to civilians traditionally falls under the
authority of the individual states.117 With respect to medical
malpractice claims in the civilian world, claims can be brought in a
court of law, a right not afforded service members.118 All states in
the United States provide civilians the opportunity to file and
litigate claims in court.119 Additionally, “there is usually a system
of appeals courts, with final judicial authority resting in the state
supreme court.”120 Civilians are given their day in court while
service members are confined to the administrative charge of an
office pursuant to the NDAA.121 While the filing of medical
malpractice claims in the military requires a bureaucratic process,
service members should not be stripped of the rights afforded to
civilians simply because the government is their employer.
In the United States, a patient alleging medical malpractice
must generally prove four elements or legal requirements to make
a successful claim of medical malpractice:
115. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731, 133
Stat. at 1459.
116. Id.
117. PETER P. BUDETTI & TERESA M. WATERS, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (May
2005), www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/medical-malpractice-law-inthe-united-states-report.pdf.
118. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731
(stating that it is the Secretary of Defense – not a court of law – that “may allow,
settle, and pay a claim against the United States”).
119. B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United
States, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS AND RELATED RSCH. 339, 341 (2009).
120. Id.
121. Sheldon & Bean, supra note 82.
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(1) the existence of a legal duty on the part of the doctor to provide
care or treatment to the patient;(2) a breach of this duty by a failure
of the treating doctor to adhere to the standards of the profession; (3)
a causal relationship between such breach of duty and injury to the
patient; and (4) the existence of damages that flow from the injury
such that the legal system can provide redress.122

Civilian medical malpractice claims require a showing of duty,
breach, causation, and damages, while the NDAA prescribes that
the claim be “for personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of a Department of Defense health care
provider.”123 The legal requirements for civilian medical
malpractice claims are concise and straightforward, avoiding the
vagueness issues presented in the NDAA.
The damages afforded to civilians who experience medical
malpractice “take into account both actual economic loss such as
lost income and cost of future medical care, as well as noneconomic
losses, such as pain and suffering.”124 For personal injury, civilians
can recover for the following damages: compensation for the cost of
medical bills arising from all injuries caused by the defendant; lost
wages; pain and suffering; emotional distress; wrongful death; loss
of companionship/loss of consortium; and occasionally punitive
damages.125 While there are damages caps in some states, most
states “place a ‘cap’ on non-economic damages only, which includes
compensation for things like ‘pain and suffering.’”126 Comparatively
speaking, civilians are afforded more forms of redress that the
122. Bal, supra note 119, at 342.
123. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731.
124. Bal, supra note 119, at 340. “To win monetary compensation for injury
related to medical negligence, a patient needs to prove that substandard
medical care resulted in an injury.” Id. “Once the injured person has established
that negligence led to injury, the court calculates the monetary damages that
will be paid in compensation.” Id.
125. David Goguen, Damages in Your Personal Injury Case, ALLLAW,
www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/damages.html [perma.cc/ZMN7RJLA] (last visited Aug. 16, 2021) [hereafter Goguen I]. “The medical
bills/medical treatment component of damages will include the cost of care
already received, and the cost of care that will be necessary in the future.” Id.
“Compensation for lost wages or lost income … includes payment for any work
that a plaintiff had to miss because of the injury or to receive treatment for the
injury.” Id. “The other main component of damages in a personal injury case is
‘non-economic’ damages, which includes compensation for the injured person's
‘pain and suffering.’” Id. Lastly, loss of companionship/loss of consortium “are
damages suffered by the injured person’s spouse, partner or close family
member, in terms of their relationship with the injured person.” Id.
126. David Goguen, State-by State Medical Malpractice Damages Caps,
NOLO, www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-state-medical-malpracticedamages-caps.html [perma.cc/9CLH-48BE] (last visited Aug. 16, 2021)
[hereafter Goguen II]. “[A] few state legislatures have passed an umbrella cap
on all forms of damages in medical malpractice cases, including compensation
for the costs of long-term disability.” Id. Currently, 35 states have some sort of
statutory cap on damages. Id. If a state is not listed, “that means there is
currently no statutory cap on damages.” Id.
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government fails to offer or provide to service members in the
NDAA.127

IV. PROPOSAL
With respect to relief for medical malpractice, service members
should be offered equal forms of redress like civilians for personal
injury or death caused by negligence. When the NDAA was signed
into law, it provided relief denied to service members since Feres in
1950.128 This Act, however, fails to provide fair and just relief to
service members for medical malpractice claims. The
disproportionate redress for service members places undue
hardship on those serving their country from rightful compensation.
In a country that reveres service members, denying them rights and
privileges offered to civilians fosters an unjust system under the
law. There are three potential solutions to combat the shortcomings
of the NDAA: (A) addressing due process; (B) addressing the
“prescribed” regulations; and (C) addressing payment of claims.

A. Addressing Due Process
The first proposed solution to the NDAA is addressing due
process. At present, subsection (a) gives the Secretary the authority
to prescribe what the Secretary considers appropriate under
subsection (f).129 The NDAA therefore prevents the adjudication of
medical malpractice claims in court.130 Such denial violates service
members’ constitutional due process rights. “Throughout American
history, the military justice system has been criticized as indifferent
to the constitutional rights of members of the armed forces.”131 The
NDAA prevents service members from having their day in court,
whether it be in a federal court or a court-martial.132
127. Compare Goguen I, supra note 125 (exploring civil lawsuits and the
“different types of damages that could come into play in a personal injury case”),
with National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731 (limiting
settlements for personal injury and death to criteria prescribed by the Secretary
of Defense).
128. Compare Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (“We conclude that the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where
the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service”) with
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731 (providing
“Authorization of Claims by Members of the Uniformed Services Against the
United States for Personal Injury or Death Caused by Medical Malpractice.”).
129. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731, 133
Stat. at 1457-59.
130. Sheldon & Bean, supra note 82 (“Service members will not be permitted
to sue in federal court.”).
131. Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the Probability of
Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 439 (1994).
132. Jim Absher, What is a Military Court Martial?, MILITARY.COM (July 30,
2021), www.military.com/benefits/military-legal-matters/courts-martial-
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In the military justice system, it does not appear that medical
malpractice claims have a place. Military medical malpractice
claims would potentially fall under Special Court-Martial –
“characterized as a misdemeanor court” – or General Court-Martial
– “characterized as a felony court” – however, neither seem fitting
for the claim.133 While some may argue military related issues
should be handled internally, within the government or
Department of Defense, the current system strips service members
of their constitutional rights and fails to provide redress for medical
malpractice in the military justice system. With respect to ensuring
fair and equal redress, “[n]o persons should be more entitled to
protection of their constitutional rights than the servicemen
engaged in protecting the sovereignty of the United States.”134
To address due process, the NDAA – rather than provide the
Secretary full discretion to manage and settle medical malpractice
claims for service members – should allow service members to bring
forth their claims in court, be that federal or court-martial. In the
military, while only a select group of Judge Advocates135 serve as
legal counsel for individual clients,136 entities such as Area Defense

explained.html [perma.cc/DDU9-3MAF]. “[A] court martial is a legal proceeding
for military members that is similar to a civilian court trial.” Id. There are three
different types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial; special courtmartial; and (3) general court-martial. Id. A summary court-martial is for less
serious offenses that involve enlisted members of the uniform services. Id.
Summary court-martials preside in front of “one commissioned officer who
serves as judge and jury.” Id. A special court-martial handles misdemeanortype offenses. Id. Such court-martial subjects enlisted members, officers, and
the like to the UCMJ. Id. A special-court martial presides in front “of a panel of
not less than three members and a military judge.” Id. The accused also has the
discretion of choosing to preside in front of a military judge alone. Id. A generalcourt martial is for more serious, felony-type offenses. Id. “A general courtmartial consists of a panel of not less than five members and a military judge,
or an accused may be tried by military judge alone on their request.” Id.
133. Id.
134. SUBCOMM. ON CONST. RTS. OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH
CONG., CONST. RTS. OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (Comm. Print 1963). “[T]he
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights has been concerned since its formation
with the rights of military personnel and has made several studies in that
connection.” Id. “The subcommittee has followed closely the perceptible trend in
the Federal courts toward greater judicial protection for the American
serviceman.” Id.
135. Stephen Ruiz, What It Takes to Become a Member of the Military JAG
Corps, MILITARY.COM (June 22, 2021), www.military.com/join-military/what-ittakes-become-member-of-military-jag-corps.html
[perma.cc/U7RH-KKPY]
(explaining that “Judge Advocate” is the colloquial term for military attorneys
in the Judge Advocate General’s Corp).
136. See Staff Sergeant Luis Mario Hans, How the Special Victims’ Counsel
Program Serves Joint Base San Antonio, JOINT BASE SAN ANTONIO (June 4,
2018),
www.jbsa.mil/News/News/Article/1540006/how-the-special-victimscounsel-program-serves-joint-base-san-antonio/
[perma.cc/R8PM-SJGY]
(explaining that “Judge Advocate General attorneys . . . provide legal assistance
to individual clients.”).
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Counsel137 (“ADC”) and Special Victims’ Counsel138 (“SVC”) exist to
provide for such representation. The system of representation for
individual clients in the military already exists under the ADC and
SVC; redress for medical malpractice for service members can be
sought through representation by ADC or a similarly run entity
specialized in medical malpractice claims.
“Pursuant to Article I of the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress has the power to
provide for the trial and punishment of military . . . offenses.”139 At
present, the same individual or group of individuals in the military
manage medical malpractice claims internally. Such independent
policing in the military continues to deprive service members of
their right to a trial. “The military justice system is composed of
three tiers of courts established under Article I of the United States
Constitution [:]” (1) the United States Court of Military Appeals; (2)
the Judge Advocates General; and (3) military trial judges.140 The
infrastructure for hearing claims is already in place, however, it is
not being used for medical malpractice claims in the military.
Service members should not be deprived of their due process
rights for the benefit of the government to handle matters
137. Area Defense Counsel, Scott Air Force Base,
www.scott.af.mil/Units/Area-Defense-Counsel/ [perma.cc/S2J8-QLKS] (last
visited Aug. 29, 2021) (“The Area Defense Counsel (ADC) is an experienced
judge advocate who provides legal defense services to active duty Service
members in Uniform Code of Military Justice proceedings and adverse
administrative actions.”).
138. See United States Air Force Special Victims’ Counsel Program,
www.afjag.af.mil/Portals/77/documents/SVC/CLSV_Handout_2018.pdf?ver=20
18-05-16-091142-727 [perma.cc/T56C-NBHX] (last visited Aug. 29, 2021)
(explaining that Special Victims’ Counsel “represent victims [of sexual
assault] at every step of the military justice process to enforce their rights”).
139. Ferris, supra note 131, at 443. “The power of a commissioned officer in
the United States Armed Forces to convene a court-martial is derived from
Article I of the Constitution, which specifies the powers granted to Congress.”
Id. at 442. “Clause 14 authorizes Congress ‘to make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.’” Id. at 442-43 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14). “In addition, Clause 18 empowers Congress to ‘make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers.’” Id. at 443 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
140. Id. at 452-55. The United States Court of Military Appeals “reviews
cases from the Courts of Military Review. There are four Courts of Military
Review, one each for the Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air
Force.” Id. at 453. “The Courts of Military Review consider questions of both
law and fact.” Id. “Indirectly, through inferior judge advocates, the Judge
Advocates General of each service oversee the selection, appointment, and
evaluation of military trial judges, who are chosen from a pool of eligible
commissioned officers in accordance with criteria established by Congress.” Id.
at 454. Lastly, “[m]ilitary trial judges are the equivalent of United States
District Court Judges and Magistrate Judges who preside over Article III
courts.” Id. at 455. “The military trial judge has the power to rule on all
questions of law raised during the court-martial and to instruct the members of
the court-martial panel on questions of law and procedure.” Id.
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administratively. While the current system makes it easier for the
government to hear and settle claims, it is not beneficial nor
desirable for service members. It strips service members of rights
afforded to civilians. Joining the military should not come at the
cost of sacrificing one’s life and constitutional rights.

B. Addressing the “Prescribed” Regulations
In addition to addressing due process, the second proposed
solution is to modify the prescribed regulations of the NDAA so that
there are specific regulations laid out. As subsection (f) of the NDAA
currently reads, there are no prescribed regulations, only general
topic areas that the Secretary has the discretion to implement or
modify.141 This again raises a due process issue of vagueness. The
“void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but
discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should
know what is required of them…; second, precision and guidance
are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an
arbitrary or discriminatory way.”142 The NDAA does not prescribe
specific procedures or standards, and the Act grants overarching
discretion to the Secretary which could lead the Secretary to act in
an arbitrary or discriminatory way.143
As the Secretary is the sole individual in charge of enforcing
the NDAA,144 the lack of oversight or involvement of the military
justice system in filing and settling military medical malpractice
claims appears antithesis to fairness and justice. To address the
issue of the prescribed regulations, the NDAA, like any other
regulation or statute, should prescribe specific regulations for
implementation, such as how claims will be processed, the
procedure for payment of claims, and the extent to which the
Secretary will be using the FTCA to settle claims. While offering
redress to service members for medical malpractice is a new policy,
service members should know their rights under the NDAA. If laws
can be void for vagueness in the civilian system because of the due
process concerns listed above, then similarly written laws should
not stand in matters relating to service members. Service members
are United States citizens and are entitled to the same
141. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No.
116-92, § 731, 133 Stat. 1198, 1458 (2019).
142. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). “The void-forvagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” Little v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp.
3d 699, 704 (W.D. Va. 2015). “The Due Process Clause thus ‘requires the
invalidation’ of a statute that ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’’” Id. at 705 (quoting United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
143. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 731.
144. Id.
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constitutional rights and protections as civilians. Our military
defends the rights and freedoms afforded to United States citizens,
yet under this Act, service members are deprived of constitutional
rights that they demand other countries give to their citizens.

C. Addressing Payment of Claims
A final proposed solution to the issue is addressing payment of
claims under the NDAA. Under subsection (d) of the NDAA, the
Secretary has the discretion to decide whether a claim is
meritorious.145 If a claim is determined to be meritorious, service
members are limited to $100,000 in damages, and any excess
amount will be sent to the Treasury for review.146 While this may
be standard practice in the government relating to principles of
sovereign immunity, limiting service members’ opportunities and
abilities for redress widens the divide between justice offered to
civilians and justice offered to service members.
To address the issue of payment of claims under the NDAA,
the federal government should raise the amount the Secretary is
permitted to pay the claimant to make the amount more comparable
to the average medical malpractice payment for civilians. As called
out above, the average medical malpractice payment for U.S.
citizens in 2019 was $348,065.147 The capped amount for service
members under the NDAA demonstrates further disparity in the
redress afforded to civilians versus members of the Armed Forces.
The cap placed on recoverable damages under the NDAA is not
equal to nor comparable to the relief afforded to civilians.

V. CONCLUSION
For too long, the Feres Doctrine has negatively impacted the
military’s trust in the justice system after years of their government
denying redress. The NDAA attempts to make reparation to service
members and/or their families. Although the NDAA provides
service members monetary damage relief, it fails to provide service
members the same constitutional rights and privileges afforded to
their civilian counterparts. In a country founded on the tenet that
145. § 731, 133 Stat. at 1458. Subsection (d)(1) states:
If the Secretary of Defense determines, pursuant to regulations
prescribed by the Secretary under subsection (f), that a claim under this
section in excess of $100,000 is meritorious, and the claim is otherwise
payable under this section, the Secretary may pay the claimant $100,000
and report any meritorious amount in excess of $100,000 to the Secretary
of the Treasury for payment under section 1304 of title 31.
Id.
146. Id.
147. 2019 Medical Malpractice Payout Report, supra note 114.

756

UIC Law Review

[54:731

“all men are created equal,”148 the NDAA creates an unfair and
unjust division between civilians and those who serve their country.
To mitigate the divide in redress for civilians and service members,
the government must address the NDAA’s shortcomings of
depriving service members of their constitutional rights and
opportunity for justice and relief.
The NDAA reduces the inequities of the Feres Doctrine – “‘one
of the most ill-considered and harmful doctrines ever created by the
Supreme Court’” – but leaves our service members exposed to the
deleterious effects of medical malpractice.149 While the military is
no longer “shielded from responsibility for poor outcomes of care[,]”
our service members continue to accrue the pain of being denied due
process and adequate relief.150 Denial of redress for injury incident
to service equates to a lack of thanks and appreciation because of
service. To be denied justice or redress incident to service
compounds the sacrifice of our revered service members.

148. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
149. Steve Sternberg, Military Can No Longer Avoid Medical Malpractice
Claims, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 19, 2019), www.usnews.com/news/healthnews/articles/2019-12-19/military-can-no-longer-avoid-medical-malpracticeclaims [perma.cc/3AQH-TZNW].
150. Id.

